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Consumer versus citizen preferences
in contingent valuation: evidence on
the role of question framing∗
Ville Ovaskainen and Matleena Kniivil¨ a†
Rather than individual consumer preferences, responses to referendum-style contingent
valuation surveys on environmental goods may express citizen assessments that take
into account beneﬁts to others. We reconsider the consumer versus citizen hypothesis
with a focus on the role of framing information. Survey data on conservation areas in
Ilomantsi, Finland, are used. Different versions of the valuation question were used to
encourage the respondents to take the consumer or the citizen role. The citizen version
expectedly resulted in substantially fewer zero-WTP responses and protests and higher
mean and median WTP, suggesting that the framing information has a major effect on
the preferences expressed. The ﬁndings support the idea of multiple preferences. For a
more conﬁdent interpretation of contingent valuation responses, future studies should
recognise their intended use in survey design and gain information about respondents’
motives to determine the presence and type of altruistic motives.
Key words: altruism, beneﬁt–cost analysis, conservation areas, contingent valuation, multiple
preference orderings, referendum, spike model.
1. Introduction
Contingent valuation (CV) originated as a means to estimate environmental beneﬁts
and/or costs for the beneﬁt–cost analysis (BCA) of development projects and public
goods. For CV surveys to provide information on individual willingness to pay (WTP),
the responses are interpreted as expressions of consumer preferences. However, this
interpretation has been questioned (e.g., Stevens etal. 1991, 1993; Kohn 1993), partic-
ularly with the now standard referendum format. The referendum model has more in
common with voting (political choice) than with a consumer’s market-place decisions
(the pseudo-market setting). This may encourage respondents to express citizen values
based on ethical and political judgements rather than pure consumer preferences over
bundles of goods (Blamey etal. 1995).
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If CV surveys are viewed as surrogates for voting, it is no longer obvious that the
resultscanbeincorporatedinaBCA.Ithasbeenarguedthataltruisticvaluesshouldbe
excluded from a BCA because including WTP because of altruistic reasons results in a
double counting of beneﬁts (Bergstrom 1982; Milgrom 1993; Diamond and Hausman
1994). If the respondents take into account the beneﬁts to others, aggregate beneﬁt
measuresmaybedoublecounting,undercounting,ormeaningless(Blameyetal.1995).
For a proper interpretation, one should know whether the respondents are expressing
consumer preferences or citizen assessments. If the responses are a mixture of personal
and social values, aggregation may amount to adding ‘apples and oranges’ (Nyborg
2000).
Sagoff (1988) sees the individual consumer’s self-interested choices as entirely sep-
arate from the choices people make as citizens for the ‘good of the community’. The
view that individuals may have multiple, possibly conﬂicting preference orderings as-
sociated with different roles and contexts has been advocated by several other authors
(Arrow 1951; Harsanyi 1955; Sen 1977; Margolis 1982; Hausman and McPherson
1996; Nyborg 2000). There is also evidence of the possibility of affecting the respon-
dents’ motivations by the context and framing information given. Ajzen etal. (1996)
found that under low personal relevance, WTP for a public good was signiﬁcantly
higher when an altruistic, as opposed to an individualistic, orientation was activated.
Russell etal. (2001) suggest that altruistic, as opposed to private, preferences can be
triggeredbysmallframingchanges.ThisraisesachallengetothedesignofCVsurveys.
CurtisandMcConnell(2002)havearguedthatthemotivesmanifestedinchoicesfor
public goods can be explained through the model of the citizen or through consumer
preferences with altruism, and that the two models are essentially indistinguishable,
especially empirically. Therefore, what matters is whether different motives imply dif-
ferences in the WTP for public goods. Curtis and McConnell found in a CV study that
there was no difference in WTP between those with citizen or altruistic preferences
and those with presumably purely private consumer preferences.
The preceding comments paint two rather opposite views on the citizen versus
consumer issue and its implications. While Blamey etal. (1995) question the use of CV
results for the BCA of public goods, Curtis and McConnell (2002) suggest that since
mean WTP does not differ, it is effectively irrelevant which preferences prevail. In their
view the citizen versus consumer distinction hardly represents a real problem.
This paper reconsiders the consumer versus citizen hypothesis with a focus on
the role of framing information. Two different valuation questions accordingly were
used. The consumer version used a standard discrete-choice WTP question asking the
respondents to consider the impacts of a nature conservation project on their own
welfare only, while the citizen version encouraged them to take into account impacts
on the whole society’s welfare and used a voting question. We provide evidence on
the following questions. First, does the framing information guide the respondents to
choose a particular role so that this could be used to control the type of preferences
expressed? The impact of framing is considered in terms of mean and median WTP,
as well as zero-WTP and protest responses. Second, based on factors affecting project
acceptance, does a given type of framing guide the respondent to take a purely private
or purely social point of view? Third, we test for the impact of explicit information
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on development beneﬁts. In estimating the mean and median WTP, we use the spike
model(Kristr¨ om1997),whichallowsforthepossibilityofzeroWTP.Thepublicdebate
around our empirical case, conservation areas in eastern Finland, actually suggests
that a part of the population obtains no personal beneﬁts from preservation of these
areas.
Our ﬁndings differ from the relatively unproblematic view suggested in Curtis and
McConnell (2002) and support the suggestions by Ajzen etal. (1996), Nyborg (2000)
and Russell etal. (2001). According to our results, the distinction between ‘citizen’
(e.g., altruistic) and ‘consumer’ preferences is essential, and the framing and context
information has a predictable effect on which role the respondent takes. Respondents
exposed to a citizen-oriented voting question expressed a substantially higher mean
WTP, as well as fewer zero-WTP and protest responses, than those who were asked
to consider a standard dichotomous WTP question from the purely personal point
of view. Thus, while CV instruments that fail to specify the desired type of responses
will result in ambiguous results with unknown applicability to BCA, a more conﬁdent
interpretation is available through an appropriate framing and orientation of the CV
question. Further, it seems important for CV studies to gain information on respon-
dents’ motives in order to determine the presence and type of altruism (McConnell
1997). The ﬁnding that respondents may consider economic impacts regardless of the
information presented also lends support to the view that it could be appropriate to
focus on citizen responses and the voting interpretation (Blamey etal. 1995).
The background and hypotheses are more fully discussed in Section 2. Section 3
describes our empirical application, data and modelling approach. The estimation
results are presented in Section 4. Section 5 considers the use of the results in the BCA
versus the majority-voting context, and Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Background and hypotheses
2.1 Theoretical background
Nyborg (2000) stresses that even though the preferences manifested in social choices
may look similar to consumer preferences with altruism, there is an important concep-
tual difference between social preferences and personal well-being functions, however
altruistic. Thus, altruism (broadly, utility derived from other people’s welfare) is just
one possible source of public or citizen, as opposed to private or consumer, prefer-
ences. On the other hand, Curtis and McConnell (2002) argue that the ‘citizen’ and
altruistic consumer models are essentially indistinguishable. Based on this argument,
we consider ‘citizen preferences’ as synonymous to preferences with altruism.
AltruismhasreceivedspecialattentionbecauseofitspotentialimplicationsforBCA.
It has been argued that altruistic components of WTP should not be included in BCA
(Bergstrom 1982; Milgrom 1993; Diamond and Hausman 1994). According to Blamey
etal. (1995), the standard use of CV results assumes that respondents act as consumers
and consider only the project’s environmental impacts on themselves (category 1).
If CV provides an estimate of total costs and beneﬁts (category 2), BCA reduces to
CV. If respondents consider beneﬁts to others (category 3), aggregate measures may
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be double counting, undercounting, or meaningless. If the respondents also consider
economic impacts such as implications for jobs (category 4), a double counting of
preservation costs takes place (Blamey 1996). Blamey etal. (1995) argue that category
3 or 4 responses are not valid for BCA unless consumer preferences can be extracted.
If the CV survey is interpreted as a referendum surrogate, personal appraisals of the
project’s total net beneﬁts are precisely what is required.
Otherauthors(Johansson1992;McConnell1997)havestressedthattheimplications
ofaltruismdependonitsspeciﬁctype.Purelynon-paternalisticaltruism(gettingutility
from others’ overall well-being) would not affect the BCA outcome, but this is not the
case for more plausible types of altruism (McConnell 1997). Mixed altruism, with the
altruist valuing others’ consumer surplus from a natural resource, may inﬂuence BCA,
andpurelypaternalisticaltruism(caringaboutthequantityofnaturalresourceservices
used by others) raises the beneﬁts and enhances the prospects for project approval. In
realistic cases, different types of altruism are likely to coexist.
2.2 Hypotheses
A question that merits further investigation because of its implications for CV surveys
is whether, as suggested in Ajzen etal. (1996) and Russell etal. (2001), responses of a
particular type can be activated by an appropriate framing and orientation of the CV
question. To test for this, we compare WTP for a preservation program using three
different questions. These seek to activate private (consumer) preferences, activate
‘citizen’ (altruistic) preferences, and provide additional information on development
beneﬁts, respectively. An individual’s WTP for such a program can be deﬁned for each
case as follows.
In a discrete-choice CV survey the respondent is asked to accept or reject a public
project with a given monetary cost (A) and a given impact on the environment. In line
with our empirical application, consider a prospective deterioration in environmental
quality so that WTP to prevent the change measures the equivalent variation (e.g.,
Johansson 1993). Then, WTP by individual i to prevent a decrease in the provision of








whereV i(yi,z)istheindirectutilityfunctionforindividuali,yi isincome,z0 istheinitial
level of environmental goods with the preservation program, and z1 is the ﬁnal level
without the program (note that z0 >z1). This represents our ﬁrst case with standard
consumer preferences (category 1 in Blamey etal. 1995).
By the above reasoning, our second case with ‘citizen preferences’ (category 3 in
Blamey etal.) can be simply represented by assuming altruism, such that individual i
derives utility from beneﬁts accruing to others. By letting individual i’s utility function
include the utility of ‘others’, denoted by subscript j, a non-paternalistic or mixed
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Whenever citizen i considers z as a public good, WTPi in case (2a) is likely to be
higher than that for the consumer case (1). The same holds even more clearly for the














For our third case (cf. category 4 in Blamey etal.), assume that individual i also
takes into account the costs accruing to others in terms of increased taxes and forgone












For case (3), it is no longer clear if WTPi is higher or lower than for case (1), because
this depends on whether individual i expects beneﬁts to others to be greater or smaller
than the respective costs.
3. Empirical application and data
3.1 The scenario and valuation problem
Our empirical CV application deals with conservation areas located in Ilomantsi, the
province of North Karelia, eastern Finland. These include two national parks, one
strict nature reserve, and protection areas for mires and old-growth forest with a total
of 20000hectares (7.2% of the land area in Ilomantsi) of strictly protected forest and
peatland, 33percent of which is productive forest land. The case deals with a pure
public good that has been an issue of public debate, which could make citizen values
most likely to be expressed (Blamey etal. 1995).
Since existing conservation areas are considered, the suggested change would mean
a loss to those who value preservation, so a willingness to accept compensation (WTA)
question could be relevant. Because of the well-known problems with WTA questions,
however, WTP questions were used following Arrow etal. (1993). The respondents
were asked about their WTP to support the sustained preservation (i.e., avoid the
loss) of the conservation areas as opposed to a development alternative, or about their
willingness to vote for a program that implies a speciﬁed tax increase to guarantee this
aim.
Conservation may not contribute to some people’s welfare at all, and some may
actually dislike preservation. Thus, some respondents may have zero or negative WTP.
Alternative approaches for modelling heterogeneous preferences with zero and neg-
ative as well as positive WTP exist (Keith etal. 1996; Haab and McConnell 1997;
Kristr¨ om 1997; Hanemann and Kanninen 1998; Huhtala 2000; Clinch and Murphy
2001; MacMillan etal. 2001; Saz-Salazar and Garcia-Mendez 2001). However, a cred-
ible WTP question for respondents with negative preferences was difﬁcult to formulate
here. Thus, all respondents were presented with the same WTP question and a follow-
up question was used to identify zero or negative WTP and protest responses. Those
who refused to pay (voted against the program) at both the initial bid and the lower
follow-up bid were asked about their main reason for refusal. The reported reasons
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were used to classify the responses as positive, zero or negative WTP or protest. This
allowed us to explicitly account for positive and zero WTP, but because the bid vector
contained only positive values, the actual distribution of negative WTP is unknown.
The few cases representing negative WTP were therefore coded as zero WTP, which
seemed justiﬁed for our data.
3.2 Questionnaire and sample
The respondents were ﬁrst given information on nature conservation in Finland and
facts on the speciﬁc conservation areas. To avoid the part–whole bias the area in
concern was compared to the total protected area in North Karelia and in Finland,
andtherespondentswereremindedthatonlyIlomantsi’sconservationareaswerebeing
considered. Maps were used to clarify the valuation object. The respondents were
reminded about their budget constraint and the other projects they might support.
After a description of the conservation areas two alternatives for their future use
were presented. The preservation alternative would maintain the present conservation
network. This would ensure the survival of valuable habitats and threatened species in
the area, but require higher taxation to cover the costs. The development alternative
involvedabolishingconservationandusingtheareasfortimberproduction,orpossibly
forpeatproductionordevelopmentfortourism.Thetaxincreasewouldbeavoided,but
habitats and species could be lost. The questionnaire also included questions about
the respondent’s socioeconomic background, attitudes towards nature conservation
and environmental issues, and motivations for valuing the conservation areas. The
questionnaire was pre-tested four times using small samples.
3.3 The valuation questions
The basic difference between the consumer and citizen versions was in the framing and
format of the valuation question. To exclude payment vehicle effects, a tax change was
used as the payment mechanism even for the consumer version.1 All versions used the
same bid vector.
The consumer version asked the respondent to consider the impacts on her own
welfare only, used the standard discrete-choice WTP question, and cited only the
personal tax change as the cost. The introduction to the WTP question was: ‘Consider
the pros and cons of the alternatives solely from the point of view of your own welfare.
Should it be necessary to collect additional funds for sustaining the conservation areas
in Ilomantsi, would you be willing to pay a yearly extra tax for this purpose?’ The
actual WTP question was: ‘Would you personally be willing to pay FIM X yearly as
an extra tax to safeguard the sustained preservation of conservation areas in Ilomantsi
also in the future?’
1 Taxation is the conventional mechanism of raising funds for conservation in Finland.
Taxation can also be expected to satisfy incentive compatibility, particularly the conditions that
the payment is compelled and decoupled (see Green et al. 1998). In the Finnishcontext, taxation
is likely understood to refer to income taxation, unless otherwise stated. Our target population
was of tax-paying age. Reference to taxation also indicates implicitly that the payments are
shared independently of any individual response.
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Citizen version 1 encouraged the respondent to take a citizen view and consider the
impactsonherownaswellasthewholesociety’swelfare,usedthesurrogatereferendum
(voting) question, and similarly cited only the personal tax change as the cost. The
introduction read: ‘Consider the pros and cons of the alternatives as a citizen from the
point of view of your own welfare as well as the whole society. If such a referendum
were arranged, would you support the sustained preservation of conservation areas in
Ilomantsi, if that meant to you an extra yearly tax?’ The actual question was: ‘If the
sustained preservation of existing conservation areas in Ilomantsi would cause you an
extra yearly tax of FIM X, would you vote for preservation?’ Citizen version 2 differed
from version 1 only in providing additional information on the economic impacts of
the development alternative. These included the estimated increases in the area for
timber production, jobs and stumpage revenue in forestry, and a possible loss of jobs
and income in nature-based tourism.
The bid vector used was FIM 50–100–250–400–600–900 (corresponding to EUR
8.4–16.8–42.0–67.3–100.9–151.4) per person per year, and each lower follow-up bid
was half the initial bid. In addition to ‘yes’ and ‘no’, a ‘Don’t know’ option was
offered (see Arrow etal. 1993). In all, 25.1percent of the respondents of valuation
questions chose that option and were not included in the analysis. Item non-response
to the valuation question was 2.8percent. Further, 7.8percent of the responses to the
valuation questions were classiﬁed as protests. The protest responses were excluded
from the analysis.
3.4 The sample
We used a mail survey with a sample of 2400 people aged 18 to 75years in the province
of North Karelia. Each version was sent in October 2000 to 800 respondents drawn
from the census of Finland by systematic random sampling. A reminder was sent to
non-respondentsinthreeweeks.Thisproducedanoverallresponserateof58.4percent.
To examine the impact of non-response, a sample of non-respondents was interviewed
by phone three months later. Since no difference was found between respondents’
and non-respondents’ attitudes towards nature conservation, there seems to be no
sample selection bias. When compared with respect to age, income and opinions on
the importance and desirability of conservation (based on questions asked prior to
the WTP question, thus unaffected by differences in framing and information given),
no signiﬁcant differences were found between the consumer version and two citizen
versions combined.
4. Results
4.1 Initial descriptive results
The proportions of ‘yes’, ‘no’ and ‘Don’t know/Wouldn’t vote’ responses differed sig-
niﬁcantly between the consumer versus citizen versions (Table1). For the consumer
version, more than 60percent of respondents refused to pay the initial bid and only
20percent accepted it. This differs signiﬁcantly (P=0.000) from the citizen versions,
whichbothhad34–37percentof‘yes’and‘no’responses.Anotherdifferenceappeared
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Table1 Proportions of ‘yes’, ‘no’ and ‘Don’t know/Wouldn’t vote’ responses to the initial bid
by version, percent (protest responses not excluded)
Consumer Citizen 1 Citizen 2
(n=459) (n=448) (n=450)
Yes 20 36 36
No 61 37 34
Don’t know/Wouldn’t vote 19 27 30
in the proportion of ‘Don’t know/Wouldn’t vote’ answers. For the citizen versions, al-
most every third respondent chose this option. While the respondents could easily
choose the best option for their own welfare, voting on behalf of the whole commu-
nity seemed more difﬁcult. The difference between the versions shows in the survival
functions (Figure1).
The frequencies of different reasons for refusal to pay for those who responded
‘no’ at both bids are shown in Table2. In total more than 50percent of the reported
reasons fell into categories suggesting that the respondent could not afford to pay,
did not receive any beneﬁts from the areas, or had already paid enough (options 2, 3
or 6). All these responses were interpreted to indicate indifference, or zero WTP. Few
respondentsagreedwiththepropositionsthatconservationareascontributenegatively
to welfare so that conservation should be abolished (option 4) or compensation should
rather be made (option 5). Options 4 and 5 actually indicate negative WTP, but the
observations were few (6.2, 3.6 and 4.4% by version) and had little effect on mean and
median WTP. Therefore, they were coded as zero WTP for the analysis. Options 7–10
(15.7–24% of all reported reasons for refusal) were interpreted as protest responses.
The protests accounted for 4.2 and 4.7percent of all WTP responses for the citizen
versions,butasmuchas14.4percentfortheconsumerversion.Respondentsreporting



























Figure1 Empirical survival distributions, with smoothing procedure due to Ayer etal. (1955).
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Table2 Frequencies of reasons for refusal to pay, percent of all reported reasons for refusal
Consumer Citizen 1 Citizen 2
1. The bids are too high 7.5 11.2 6.4
2. I cannot afford to pay anything 21.8 24.6 19.7
3. I receive no beneﬁt from the existence of the
conservation areas in question
13.2 12.7 14.8
4. Conservation areas in Ilomantsi cause only
disadvantage, and conservation should be
abolished
3.0 3.0 2.8
5. Conservation areas in Ilomantsi cause
losses, and compensation should be paid
because of their existence
3.4 6.7 5.6
6. I support the existence of conservation
areas in Ilomantsi, but I have/people in
North Karelia/Ilomantsi have already
paid enough for them
14.3 17.1 21.8
7. If conservation in Ilomantsi were abolished,
I would be entitled to compensation
0.4
8. I would be willing to pay, but not through
taxation
3.0 1.5 3.5
9. The beneﬁts of nature conservation cannot
be measured in monetary terms
10.5 7.5 10.6
10. The question is not credible 10.1 6.7 5.6
11. Some other reason 12.8 9.0 9.2
4.2 The spike model
Given a substantial number of respondents with zero WTP, we use the ‘simple’ spike
model (Kristr¨ om 1997) to estimate the mean and median WTP. Denoting the proba-
bility that an individual’s WTP for the preservation project does not exceed a given bid
A by Fwtp(A) and assuming that WTP is distributed as the logistic, the model can be
written as
Fwtp(A) = [1 + exp(α − βA)]−1 ifA> 0
Fwtp(A) = [1 + exp(α)]−1 ifA= 0
Fwtp(A) = 0i f A< 0,
(4)
where α and β(α, β>0) represent the marginal utility of environmental goods and the
marginal utility of income, respectively.
The spike model requires information for two choices: ﬁrst, whether the respondent
is willing to pay at all; and second, whether she accepts a given bid. To generate an
indicator of whether the respondent’s WTP is positive or zero, we used the responses
to both bids and the reasons for refusal to pay anything. The values for the indicator
Si were deﬁned as follows:
Si = 1i fW T P > 0; Si = 0i fW T P = 0. (5)
WTP was classiﬁed as positive if the response was ‘yes/would vote for the project’ for
the initial or follow-up bid, or ‘no/would vote against’ for both proposed bids but
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Table3 Proportions of respondents with WTP=0a n dW T P>0, percent (protest responses
excluded)
Consumer Citizen 1 Citizen 2
(n=306) (n=309) (n=296)
WTP=0 45.1 23.9 28.4
WTP>0 54.9 76.1 71.6
WTP, willingness to pay.
the respondent would accept a lower bid (option 1 in Table2). WTP was classiﬁed as
zero (including cases with WTP<0) if the response to both bids was ‘no/would vote
against’ based on one of options 2–6 in Table2.
The second choice is whether the respondent is willing to pay the price A, or vote
for the program at the price. The indicator for this is denoted by Ti with values deﬁned
by
T i = 1i fW T P ≥ A (0 otherwise). (6)
In our application Ti =1 if the respondent accepted the initial bid.2 The log-




SiT i ln[1 − Fwtp(A)]
+Si(1 − T i)ln[Fwtp(A) − Fwtp(0)] + (1 − Si)ln[Fwtp(0)]. (7)
TheproportionsofrespondentswithzeroandpositiveWTParepresentedinTable3
(also, Figure1). The observed proportion of zero WTP, or Prob(‘no’) at zero, varied
considerably. For the consumer version, the proportion of zero-WTP was 45percent,
suggesting that many respondents feel that the conservation areas do not contribute
to their personal welfare. For both citizen versions, this proportion was much lower,
24–28percent. The consumer version differed very signiﬁcantly (P=0.000) from the
citizen versions, which did not differ from each other (P=0.215).
4.3 Estimation and results
The parameter estimates for the spike model, based on parametric estimation
with user-deﬁned optimisation in Limdep (Greene 1998), are presented in Table4.
The ‘spike’ is deﬁned as Prob(WTP=0), that is, Fwtp(0)=[1+exp(α)]−1. The esti-
mated values of the spike (Table4) are very close to the observed proportions of
2 While the WTP question in the survey was formulated in the double-bounded manner, the
estimation in this paper is single-bounded and uses only the initial bid for Ti. The follow-up bid
is used, along with the reasons for refusal to pay, to determine whether WTP is positive or zero.
Thus, it replaces a direct screening question that was not included in this survey.
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Table4 Estimated parameters and spike values for the spike models (t-ratios in parentheses)
Consumer Citizen 1 Citizen 2
(n=306) (n=309) (n=296)
α 0.1501 1.0576 0.8771
(1.29) (7.90) (6.77)
β 3.1090 2.6127 2.0338
(10.90) (10.25) (8.19)
Prob(WTP=0) 0.463 0.258 0.294
WTP, willingness to pay.
zero-WTP responses (Table3). Notably, the probability of zero WTP is substan-
tially higher for the consumer version. Even for this, the spike is below the 0.5
level. The citizen version suggests a much higher marginal utility of environmental
goods.
Mean WTP for the spike model is obtained from the formula ln[1+exp(α)]/β
(Kristr¨ om 1997; Hanemann and Kanninen 1998). Median WTP equals α/β if
[1+exp(α)]−1 =Prob(WTP=0) <0.5 and zero otherwise. The estimated mean and
median WTP by version are presented in Table5.
Mean WTP is in the range of EUR 42–101, with a highly signiﬁcant difference
between the consumer version and the citizen versions (t=5.40, signiﬁcant at the
0.1% risk level). In line with the lower proportion of zero WTP (Table4), respondents
who were encouraged to take a citizen role had a substantially higher mean WTP
for preservation. This is consistent with the idea that respondents exposed to the
‘citizen’ orientation are more likely to consider beneﬁts to others. With no evidence
that their personal beneﬁts are higher, and with no initial differences in attitudes or
demographics between the subsamples, the ﬁndings support the hypothesis that the
framing and context information, ceteris paribus, has an inﬂuence on the type of
preferences expressed and is reﬂected in WTP, as suggested in Equations (1) versus
(2a) and (2b).
The median is lower than the mean, especially for the consumer version. Median
WTP estimates still remain positive for all versions, and support the conclusion on the
role of framing. The mean WTP for citizen version 2 appears higher than the mean
for citizen version 1, but the difference is not signiﬁcant (t=1.06). The result suggests
that the additional information on economic impacts had no effect, or that various
impacts cancel out.
Table5 Mean and median WTP for the spike models, EUR/person per year†
Consumer Citizen 1 Citizen 2
Mean WTP 41.71 87.27 101.30
Standard error of mean‡ 4.19 7.32 11.07
Median WTP 8.12 68.08 72.53
†Original values in FIM were transformed into EUR by dividing with 5.94573; ‡Computed by the Gauss
approximation in Limdep (Greene 1998). WTP, willingness to pay.
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4.4 Factors affecting WTP
Factorsaffectingtheprobabilityofsupportingpreservationwerecomparedacrossver-
sions. Following Blamey etal. (1995), we used ‘consumer variables’ (income, prices),
‘citizen variables’ (attitudes towards environmental vs. economic issues, attitudes to-
wards conservation) and ‘mixed’ variables (age). The consumer variables should be
important in both models, as the standard assumptions of CV suggest that CV re-
sponses can be interpreted to express consumer preferences. If respondents making
choices on environmental public goods always act to some extent as citizens (Sagoff
1988; Blamey etal. 1995), citizen variables should also be signiﬁcant in the consumer
model.
All responses were ﬁrst treated as a single dataset with dummy variables for the
citizen versions, CITIZEN1 and CITIZEN2 testing for the effect of information.
Separate models for the consumer version and the citizen versions combined were
then estimated. BID is tax change, and INCOME is the household’s annual gross
income per family member. POLICY2 received value 1 if the respondent wished public
decision-making to focus more on the environment, while POLICY3 had value 1 if she
was happy with the current situation. The reference case was ‘decision-making should
focus more on economic issues’. CONSATT had value 1 if the respondent considered
nature conservation necessary. Protest and ‘Don’t know’ answers were excluded, and
the standard logit model was used for simplicity.
The odds for accepting the bid among respondents to the citizen versions were
more than three times that of the consumer version (Table6). The two citizen versions
did not differ signiﬁcantly, meaning that explicit information about the development
alternative had no effect. People may take economic impacts into account even spon-
taneously because the costs of preservation are discussed in public. Also, respondents
often ignore the information given in the mailed survey and base their choices on their
Table6 Logitmodelsexplainingwillingnesstoacceptthepreservationprogram(wholesample,
consumer version and citizen versions combined)
Whole sample†
Consumer model‡ Citizen model§
Odds
Variable Coefﬁcient Probability ratio Coefﬁcient Probability Coefﬁcient Probability
CONSTANT −1.54 0.000 0.215 −2.16 0.006 −0.003 0.996
BID (−β1) −0.0027 0.000 0.997 −0.0032 0.000 −0.0025 0.000
INCOME 0.00001 0.000 1.000 0.000018 0.000 0.0000068 0.004
CITIZEN1 1.19 0.000 3.286
CITIZEN2 1.25 0.000 3.484
POLICY2 1.31 0.000 3.699 1.37 0.002 1.29 0.000
POLICY3 0.86 0.000 2.368 1.01 0.019 0.75 0.005
CONSATT 1.22 0.000 3.371 1.32 0.001 1.15 0.000
AGE −0.02 0.007 0.983 −0.02 0.168 −0.02 0.016
†Whole sample: 72.6percent predicted correct; Hosmer–Lemeshow test signiﬁcance 0.203; log L −401.24;
n=769. ‡Consumer model: 79.9percent predicted correct; Hosmer–Lemeshow signiﬁcance 0.202; log
L −113.83; n=254. §Citizen model: 71.3percent predicted correct; Hosmer–Lemeshow signiﬁcance 0.467;
log L −283.73; n=515.
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prior knowledge. In our questionnaire, this information was one of many items in the
description of the alternatives. Further, economic impacts may have been considered
negligible because the impacts on timber production and nature-based tourism work
in the opposite direction.
For the separate models, consumer variables BID and INCOME entered the con-
sumer model in line with standard expectations. On the other hand, both variables
were statistically signiﬁcant in the citizen model as well. The odds ratios for income
are close to 1, indicating that the actual effect of income was relatively small.3 Positive




taken can be affected, the responses tend to be a mixture of different considerations.
Although the respondents were asked to consider only their personal beneﬁts, envi-
ronmental attitudes were still signiﬁcant; and the bid and income were still signiﬁcant
when the citizen view was emphasised.
5. Interpreting the results: beneﬁt–cost analysis versus majority voting
Our empirical ﬁndings strongly suggested that the WTP measures based on the citizen
orientation have an altruistic component. Different types of altruism are likely to be
involved. However, the framing information in this study did not discriminate between
types of altruism. Concerns about double counting would be justiﬁed if the responses
were used for aggregation, since plausible types of altruism enhance the possibility of
projectapproval(McConnell1997).ForBCA,individuals’valuationsoftheirpersonal
beneﬁts would be desirable. If the survey is interpreted as a surrogate referendum,
assessments of beneﬁts and costs to the whole society are sought. Thus, our consumer
version seems more appropriate for BCA, while the citizen version is most naturally
interpreted in the majority-voting context.
ArelatedissueisthatforBCA,meanWTPisappropriatesincethemeanisconsistent
with the Kaldor–Hicks compensation principle underlying BCA (e.g., Blamey etal.
1995; Hanemann and Kanninen 1998). For the majority-voting interpretation, the
natural choice is median WTP, which indicates the cost level at which 50percent of
respondents believe the net beneﬁts are non-negative and would vote for the program.
Accordingly, the appropriate measure for BCA would be the mean WTP based
on the consumer version. The aggregated beneﬁts of conservation in Ilomantsi clearly
exceedtheopportunitycosts(Kniivil¨ aetal.2002).Formajority-voting,theappropriate
median WTP from the citizen version was EUR 68.1–72.5/person per year (Table5).
Thedecisionrule,however,dependsonhowtherespondentsperceivedthebeneﬁtsand
costs (Blamey etal. 1995). This is not unambiguous since the additional information,
intended to encourage personal BCAs, did not have the expected effect. Assuming the
respondents recognised the beneﬁts to others but not the costs, median WTP should
3 Asonereviewerremarked,incomewouldnotbeamongthecovariatesifthetheoreticallogit
model is strictly followed. Since the utility function underlying the model Pr(yes)=[1+exp(α –
βA)]−1 is linear in income, income is differenced out.
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exceed the estimated opportunity cost (EUR 10.05/person per year), as is clearly the




To test for the observability of the consumer–citizen division and the role of survey
design therein, we considered a conservation issue in Finland using a referendum-style
survey with two different types of CV questions. One encouraged the respondents to
consider only the impacts on their own welfare using a standard dichotomous WTP
question, while the other used a voting question and asked them to take into account
beneﬁts (and costs) to others as well.
The results were consistent with the consumer–citizen distinction, and strongly sup-
ported the expectation that the framing and orientation of the CV question have a
major effect. Our results conﬁrm earlier ﬁndings by Ajzen etal. (1996) and Russell
etal. (2001) concerning the effects of framing and motivational orientation on the
WTP for public goods and, more generally, support the idea of multiple preference or-
derings(e.g.,Sagoff1988;Nyborg2000).Forthelatterissue,moredetailedinformation
about the respondents’ actual motives would further strengthen the conclusion (e.g.,
McConnell 1997). The signiﬁcantly higher mean WTP for those who were encouraged
to take a citizen or altruistic consumer role is in contrast with Curtis and McConnell
(2002), where no difference in WTP was found between these and the presumably
self-interested respondents.
The implications for the design and use of CV surveys are as follows. First, for a
moreconﬁdentinterpretationofCVresponsestheresearchershouldrecognisewhether
expressions of individual consumer preferences or citizen assessments are desired. The
orientationofCVquestionsshouldbeconsistentwiththeirintendeduseandexplicitin
whatimpactstherespondentsaresupposedtoconsider.ForBCA,meanWTPbasedon
the consumer orientation is appropriate, while for the majority-voting interpretation
the citizen-oriented median WTP is natural. Second, CV studies should gain direct
information about respondents’ motives and be explicit about how costs are shared.
This would help determine whether altruistic motives are likely to be a problem for
BCA (see McConnell 1997). Third, the responses seemed to be a mixture of consumer
and citizen considerations even when the CV questions made a sharp distinction.
Persuading respondents to take a private view on environmental issues can also be
problematic (Nyborg 2000). The ﬁnding that explicit information on the development
alternative had no effect may suggest that respondents consider economic impacts
regardless of the information. If this is the case, focusing on citizen responses and the
majority-voting interpretation could be appropriate.
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